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by Anna Ali

Andrew Corzo, et al. v. Brown Univ., et al., Case No. 22 C 00125

Class certification was put on hold in a case against Ivy League institutions for allegedly conspiring to fix financial aid awards due to allegations of misconduct by the three firms representing plaintiffs. Andrew Corzo, et al. v. Brown University, No. 22 C 00125, 2026 WL 881598, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2026). The court ordered on March 31, 2026, that, while plaintiffs had satisfied most requirements for class certification, it would defer final ruling on the motion for class certification until plaintiffs proposed new, adequate lead class counsel. Id.

Plaintiffs filed this case against defendants on January 9, 2022, alleging that each defendant participated in a price-fixing cartel designed to reduce or eliminate financial aid as a locus of competition, and artificially inflated the net price of attendance for students receiving financial aid. Id. at *2. After the close of discovery and denial of defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs moved for class certification under FRCP 23(a) and 23(b)(3). Id. Before delving into the allegations against the proposed class counsel, the court held that plaintiffs satisfied most requirements under Rule 23(a) and all requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). Id.

The court found that plaintiffs met each element for class certification under Rule 23(a) except for the element requiring adequacy of counsel. Id. at *3-10. Plaintiffs seeking class certification must establish the four requirements of Rule 23(a), commonly referred to as (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy. Id. at *4. “Adequacy is a two-part test: (i) the class representatives must not have claims in conflict with other class members, and (ii) the class representatives and proposed class counsel must be able to litigate the case vigorously and competently on behalf of named and absent class members alike.” Id. at *6 (citing In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., No. 16 C 8637, 2022 WL 1720468, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2022)).

The court readily found the first prong met, but took issue with the second prong due to alleged ethical breaches by one proposed class counsel firm since the firm’s attorney for the case allegedly inflated his time and misrepresented the contingent nature of the lawsuit. Corzo, 2026 WL 881598, at *7, *13, *20. As to the time inflation allegations, email correspondence was produced to the court that showed an attorney for the plaintiffs expressing concern over the offending firm’s lodestar. Id. at *16. Specifically, he stated there were too many partner-level hours, redundancy, and high hourly rates. Id. Defense counsel argued that plaintiffs’ counsel “put bodies on this case in order to generate time that would be used in that allocation [among plaintiffs’ counsel] so that [one of the lead counsel firms] could take a larger percentage.” Id. at *17.

As to the misrepresentations of contingency, after extensive briefing on the issue from both sides, the court discovered that the firm facing the time inflation allegations was also a party to a litigation funding agreement. Id. at *20. While counsel for the firm had made representations that they had taken on the case on a wholly contingent basis, the court found that the agreement initially provided for payment of 50% of the firm’s hourly billing with a payment cap of about $5.9 million, and its litigation expenses. Id. Later agreements modified this in stages, ultimately providing for payment of 40% of the firm’s hourly billings up to, ultimately, $14 million, and for its litigation expenses. Id.

After briefing was complete on both issues, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that they be allowed to continue representing the class, without the firm being party to the litigation funding agreement, and defendants argued that the court should deny class certification and proceed with the case on an individual basis. Id. at *22-23. Instead of choosing either option presented by the parties, the court ordered new adequate lead counsel be proposed within 21 days or the court would deny the motion for class certification. Id. at *28. The court held that the offending firm’s lack of candor and misleading statements to the existence of the litigation funding agreement, rather than the litigation funding agreement itself, required the firm’s withdrawal. Id. at *24. For the other firms, the court held that their knowledge of the agreement and affirmative adoption of misstatements “helped pull the wool over the Court’s eyes” and led to a serious violation of their duties of candor to the court. Id. at *26. The court held that counsel impaired the court’s trust in a significant way and left the court with significant doubt that the current class counsel was adequate within the meaning of Rule 23(a). Id. at *28. Thus, the court ordered new lead counsel be proposed and the two firms not party to the litigation funding agreement stay on as co-counsel. Id.

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The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm or its clients. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

This article was originally published in the California Lawyers Association E-Briefs, News and Notes: June 2026